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Restructure and Reform:  
Products-Liability Law in North Carolina 
DR. J. STANLEY MCQUADE* 
OLIVIA L. WEEKS** 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern products-liability law has developed in a relatively short 
period of time, but it has not been a systematic, continuous process.  
Instead, the law has developed erratically, in a series of sudden leaps.  
Some of the steps made in the name of progress proved to be problematic, 
and various solutions developed to address issues as they arose.  Initially, 
these progressive movements caused considerable confusion, but this 
confusion has been resolved with time.  As a result, a reasonable, workable 
consensus has developed.1 
In 1979 and 1997, respectively, two important developments emerged: 
the Model Uniform Product Liability Act (MUPLA)2 and the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability.3  These publications present a common 
yet impressive picture of products-liability law.4  Over the last several 
 
 * Lynch Professor of the Philosophy of Law, Campbell University School of Law.   
 ** Director of the Law Library and Assistant Professor of Law, Campbell University 
School of Law.  
 1. See J. Stanley McQuade, Products Liability – Emerging Consensus and Persisting 
Problems: An Analytical Review Presenting Some Options, 25 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 9–10 
(2002).   
 2. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (Oct. 31, 1979).  The 
Act was published by the Department of Commerce and was intended for enactment by the 
states.  Id.; see also VIVIAN S. CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40148, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: 
A LEGAL OVERVIEW 12 (2014).  Both the draft and final versions were introduced in the 
96th Congress but neither was enacted.  See id.  
 3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (approved 
unanimously by the diverse membership of the American Law Institute on May 20, 1997).  
 4. Much of the success of these publications stemmed from the academics who wrote 
them.  Professors James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron Twerski, two formidable scholars, 
were the case reporters for the Restatement, supported by a small army of respected judges, 
law professors, and experienced plaintiff and defense practitioners.  Similarly, MUPLA was 
managed and steered by Professor Victor Schwartz, another acclaimed scholar, who had the 
benefit of input from a variety of interested parties, including lawyers, industry executives, 
and representatives from the insurance industry. 
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decades, tort-reform movements have generated products-liability 
legislation in various jurisdictions.  These acts incorporated provisions 
from various sources, but drew heavily from MUPLA.  The North Carolina 
Products Liability Act,5 in particular, has gone through a number of 
revisions to incorporate measures introduced by the courts as well as 
provisions from MUPLA.  
This Article suggests that, although previous revisions to the North 
Carolina Products Liability Act brought progress, more revisions are 
needed, and these revisions will be best accomplished by incorporating 
additional measures into the act, especially those that have gained wide 
acceptance elsewhere.  Part I of this Article provides a brief introduction to 
the early development of products liability law.  Part I.A discusses tort-law 
influences in products liability, and Part I.B focuses on contributions from 
contract law.  Parts II.A and II.B briefly describe MUPLA and the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, respectively.  Part III 
discusses the current state of products-liability law in North Carolina and 
suggests a number of proposed improvements to North Carolina’s 
products-liability act.   
I. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS IN PRODUCTS-LIABILITY LAW 
 Products-liability law developed in American jurisdictions by 
adapting previously existing causes of action.  Change was slow at first; the 
tort of negligence was first modified by eliminating the privity 
requirement6 and later by allowing circumstantial evidence of damages.7  
Change has proceeded at an accelerated pace ever since.   
A. Tort-Law Influences 
Perhaps the most drastic change to products-liability law was the 
introduction of the strict-liability doctrine.  The doctrine of strict liability 
was originally developed in tort law in connection with dangerous entities 
on land and was later extended to “abnormally dangerous activities.”8  The 
 
 5. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99B-1 to -12 (2013).   
 6. See Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 403 (introducing the 
requirement of privity, which was widely adopted by American courts before being rejected 
in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1054 (N.Y. 1916)).   
 7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3.   
 8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  In 
determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, “[t]he essential question is 
whether the risk created is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or because of the 
circumstances surrounding it, as to justify the imposition of strict liability for the harm that 
results from it, even though it is carried on with all reasonable care.”  Id. 
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doctrine of strict liability was introduced into products-liability law by 
California Supreme Court Justice Roger J. Traynor in Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Products, Inc.,9 and was incorporated shortly thereafter into the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965.10  As a result, the doctrine 
experienced two changes.  First, strict liability was no longer purely 
connected with land and was extended to ultra-hazardous activities.11  The 
second change required establishing the defense that an activity was 
common or usual in the area, which was established by Fletcher v. 
Rylands.12  When strict liability was applied in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts to ultra-hazardous activities, the defense that the activity was usual in 
the area still applied.13  In products liability, however, all goods affected 
are usual in the area; therefore, this defense had to be dropped. 
The doctrine of strict liability for defective goods as defined in section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was an instant success.  
Jurisdiction after jurisdiction adopted it, either judicially or by legislation.14  
North Carolina remained in the minority of states that did not join this 
 
 9. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) (“A 
manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it 
is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a 
human being.”).   
 10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.   
 11. Fletcher v. Rylands (1865) 159 Eng. Rep. 737, 740–42 (dealing with ultra-
hazardous activities on land).  Ultra-hazardous activities were later extended to things like 
wild animals, explosives, and similar items in which the possession of the item alone is 
enough to trigger liability without proof of fault.  See Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 
1162, 1165 (Cal. 1978). 
 12. Fletcher, 159 Eng. Rep. at 741.  For example, when mining was usual in the area, 
there was no liability to farmers whose animals were disturbed by frequent explosions.  See, 
e.g., Hieber v. Cent. Ky. Traction Co., 140 S.W. 54, 56 (Ky. 1911) (horses); Held v. Red 
Malcuit, Inc., 230 N.E.2d 674, 676 (Ohio C.P. 1967) (pheasants); Gronn v. Rogers Constr., 
Inc., 350 P.2d 1086, 1088 (Or. 1960) (mink); Madsen v. E. Jordan Irrigation Co., 125 P.2d 
794, 795 (Utah 1942) (mink); Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 268 P.2d 645, 648–49 (Wash. 
1954) (mink). 
 13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. i.   
 14. For a representation of state decisions adopting section 402 or some form of strict 
liability, see, for example, O. S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 447 P.2d 248, 251–52 (Ariz. 1968) 
(applying section 402A to a defective boat-steering mechanism); Hiigel v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 544 P.2d 983, 987–88 (Colo. 1975) (recognizing strict liability for casting a defective 
product into the stream of commerce); Garthwait v. Burgio, 216 A.2d 189, 192 (Conn. 
1965); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 87 (Fla. 1976); Stewart v. Budget 
Rent-A-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240, 243 (Haw. 1970) (imposing strict liability on one who 
sells or leases a defective product that is dangerous to the user or consumer as long as the 
seller is in that business and the product reaches the ultimate consumer without substantial 
change); Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 518 P.2d 857, 859–60 (Idaho 1974); Hawkeye-Sec. 
Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672, 684 (Iowa 1970).   
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trend.15  This turned out to be a fortunate decision, for it soon became 
apparent that serious problems arose from strict liability as it was defined 
in section 402A.  If strict liability had been properly defined,16 there may 
have been less difficulty. 
Finally, there was a significant problem with strict liability in relation 
to design and warning defects.  The distinction between design defects and 
warning defects in strict liability and negligence is clearly 
indistinguishable.  The standard of conduct required of the defendant is the 
same for both: a duty to use reasonable care.17  The relevant defect is 
failure to design or warn in a reasonable manner when a better warning or 
design was available and should have been used.18  Most jurisdictions have 
recognized this problem and avoided it by redefining strict liability in 
design or warning cases as failure to use a better design or warning.  This 
issue was addressed in MUPLA and in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability by defining the various types of defects individually. 
As solutions developed to questions surrounding early products-
liability law, another problem arose with relation to user fault.  Because the 
defendant manufacturer could not avoid liability by showing due care in 
strict-liability jurisdictions, it was argued—although not very sensibly—
that user fault on the part of the plaintiff likewise could not be pleaded.19  
States that recognized contributory negligence were not required to 
consider this issue,20 but it did require attention in the majority of states.   
B. Contract-Law Influences 
While much of products-liability law developed from tort law, other 
developments grew out of contract law.  One such development was 
warranty law.  As a result, the source of modern products-liability law on 
 
 15. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 5.3, at 282–83 & n.106 (2005) 
(noting that as of 2005, the only states that firmly reject the doctrine of strict products 
liability in tort are Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia).   
 16. For example, expressly stating that there is no need to prove fault and that due care 
is not a defense.   
 17. See OWEN, supra note 15, § 5.9, at 331.   
 18. Id. at 330–31. 
 19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  Comment 
n mentions only two kinds of plaintiff misbehavior: (1) ordinary fault, where the plaintiff 
did not see the danger, and (2) assumption of the risk, where the plaintiff was actually aware 
of the danger but nevertheless unreasonably proceeded to chance it.  There is nothing 
mentioned between these two extremes; however assumption of risk by the plaintiff is a 
defense.  
 20. The issue of user fault on the part of the plaintiff may also affect the law in North 
Carolina if contributory negligence is abolished.   
4
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warranties is the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).21  The implied 
warranty of merchantability set out in Article 2 of the UCC reinforced 
earlier changes in products liability by dropping the privity requirement 
between the parties.22  The UCC also replaced the statute of limitations 
with a statute that was more comparable to the limitations period applied in 
tort cases.23  
Early improvements to the state of products-liability law were 
noticeable, though not always effective.  For starters, the critical notion of 
defect was defined in UCC terms24 as disappointing the expectations of the 
reasonable consumer, also known as the “consumer expectations test.”25  
This test proved somewhat vague and was less than helpful to juries faced 
with these issues in court.  The consumer expectations test was, however, 
favored by plaintiffs’ attorneys because the test made it easier to get to the 
jury with a sympathetic plaintiff.26 
These developments in early products-liability law influenced 
jurisdictions and decisions that have laid the groundwork for modern 
products-liability law in the twenty-first century. 
II. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN PRODUCTS-LIABILITY LAW 
A. MUPLA 
Federal involvement in the products-liability field can be traced to the 
Interagency Task Force on Product Liability created by the Ford 
Administration in 1976.27  The working task force was chaired by Professor 
Victor Schwartz, an acknowledged authority on torts generally and 
products liability in particular.28  After an eighteen-month study, the task 
 
 21. OWEN, supra note 15, § 1.3, at 32.   
 22. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012).  The implied 
warranty of merchantability requires that goods conform to certain minimum standards: they 
must be fit for the ordinary purpose for which the goods are used.  Id.   
 23. Id. § 2-725 (requiring that an action must be commenced within four years after the 
cause of action has accrued).   
 24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (stating that the rule “applies only 
where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller’s hands, in a condition not contemplated 
by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him”).   
 25. See OWEN, supra note 15, § 7.5, at 487–90 (discussing the consumer expectations 
test).   
 26. See id. at 490–92. 
 27. Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, The Road to Federal Product Liability 
Reform, 55 MD. L. REV. 1363, 1363 (1996).   
 28. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY: 
FINAL REPORT, at ii (1978). 
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force issued a report that recommended the drafting of a model products-
liability law for use by the states.29  A final version of the model law, 
MUPLA, was published by the Department of Commerce in 1979.30  
Although it was intended for enactment by the states, it has not been 
applied uniformly. 
The measures adopted in MUPLA were in many cases quite radical 
but were deemed persuasive by most commentators.31  The entire area of 
products-liability law was arranged around the central notion of defect until 
MUPLA abandoned the consumer expectations test for defect32 and 
replaced it with four individual forms of defects: (1) manufacturing or 
construction defects, (2) design defects, (3) informational defects, and (4) 
express warranties.33  Each of these forms was described in functional 
terms.  Section 104(A) of MUPLA, dealing with manufacturing or 
construction defects, provided that when a dangerous product deviated 
from the manufacturer’s self-established standards—for example, the 
original design or the normal product—the product was, by definition, 
unreasonably unsafe.34  Design defects were addressed in section 104(B), 
which stated that a product was defective in design if there was a safer, 
feasible alternative design that could have been adopted by the 
manufacturer.35  Section 104(C) addressed the failure to warn of non-
obvious dangers when the harm could have been prevented or mitigated by 
appropriate warnings and instructions.36  Finally, section 104(D) provided 
that, where an express warranty was made by the seller relating to the 
general safety of the product or the product’s use for a particular purpose, 
the seller would be liable if the product did not conform to the express 
warranty.37 
 
 29. Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 27, at 1366.   
 30. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (Oct. 31, 1979).   
 31. See Draft Uniform Product Liability Law, 44 Fed. Reg. 2996, 2997 (Jan. 12, 1979).  
The draft was published in the Federal Register for public comment, and over 1500 pages of 
written commentary were received by the Department of Commerce.  The overwhelming 
majority of public comment was positive.  These comments are available on file at the Law 
Library of the U.S. Department of Commerce.  
 32. Aaron D. Twerski & Alvin S. Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product 
Liability Law—A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221, 230 (1979). 
 33. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721; see also Twerski & 
Weinstein, supra note 32, at 224. 
 34. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
6
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MUPLA has not been enacted in whole by any jurisdiction.  However, 
many of its provisions have been adopted in state products-liability acts.38  
Several measures set out in MUPLA should be considered and codified by 
state legislatures.39 
Despite MUPLA’s failure to create uniformity among the states, the 
products-liability reform movement did not die there.  In 1996, the United 
States House of Representatives and the Senate each approved legislation 
that was aimed at altering the rules of law governing products-liability 
actions, damages, and allocations of liability.40  The bill, House Resolution 
956,41 was passed by both the House and the Senate by a large majority but 
was vetoed by President Clinton.42  This left MUPLA and the Restatement 
as the two principal authorities on products-liability law. 
B. The Restatement of Torts 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability shares many 
features of MUPLA.  Like MUPLA, the Restatement ignores the term 
“strict liability.”43  It substitutes precise, functional definitions of various 
types of defects for the more general consumer expectations test from 
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.44  There are, however, a 
number of differences between MUPLA and the new Restatement, and 
some of these represent the particular view of the authors.45  Others are 
probably best explained by the fact that the learned authors, Professors 
 
 38. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99B-1 to -12 (2013). 
 39. See infra notes 90–141 and accompanying text. 
 40. Cynthia C. Lebow, Federalism and Federal Product Liability Reform: A Warning 
Not Heeded, 64 TENN. L. REV. 665, 667–68 (1997). 
 41. Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th 
Cong. (1996). 
 42. See Lebow, supra note 40, at 666. 
 43. Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability: A Guide 
to Its Highlights, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 85, 88 (1998). 
 44. Id.   
 45. For example, concerns about the “sellers” exception, where the ultimate sellers are 
exempt from liability for the products that they sell, under certain conditions.  Henderson’s 
and Twerski’s objection to this widely popular measure is that it may leave plaintiffs with 
no remedy when the ultimate seller is dismissed from a products-liability action at the early 
stages because the manufacturer is available for suit and is solvent.  Then, later, at the time 
the case reaches trial, the manufacturer is insolvent and the statute of limitations has run 
against the retailers and wholesalers who were originally dismissed from the suit.  See 
JAMES A HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND 
PROCESS 74–75 (6th ed. 2008) (proposing an amendment that would toll the statute of 
limitations against retailers and wholesalers during the life of the suit against the 
manufacturer of the allegedly defective product).  
7
McQuade and Weeks: Restructure and Reform: Products-Liability Law in North Carolina
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2016
482 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:475 
James Henderson and Aaron Twerski, had to modify their views in order to 
have the support of the ALI membership, which included both plaintiff and 
defense lawyers.  A notable example of one of these compromises is the 
provision that plaintiffs need not show a feasible alternative design in all 
cases, since the design may be obviously defective and unreasonably 
dangerous with no need for an expert opinion.46  Henderson’s own 
comment on this is that the possibility of showing a defect without expert 
opinion is remote and probably nonexistent.47 
III. NORTH CAROLINA PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 
A. The Current State of the Law 
North Carolina products-liability law is still a work-in-progress.  
Serious reform began with the products-liability act, which became 
effective on October 1, 1979.48  This legislation has been periodically 
revised and updated.49   
North Carolina is one of five states that has refused to follow the 
strict-liability trend within the context of products liability.50  North 
Carolina was fortunate that its innate conservatism prevented it from 
joining the strict-liability movement in the 1960s and 1970s and was saved 
from several decades of confusion.  
Strict liability, precisely defined, means that manufacturers and sellers 
are automatically liable for selling defective products that cause harm.51  
The plaintiff is not required to show that the defendant was at fault, and due 
care on the part of the defendant is not a defense.52  This notion, despite 
statements to the contrary, can be found in the implied warranty of 
 
 46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (allowing 
the plaintiff to infer a defect in situations where common experience shows that an inference 
of defect may be warranted under the specific facts). 
 47. See Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for 
Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061, 1095 
(2009).  
 48. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99B-1 to -12 (2013).  
 49. One update came in the form of a provision on ineffective warnings and instructions 
that was added in 1995.  See Act of July 29, 1995, ch. 522, § 1, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1872, 
1874–76 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-5). 
 50. OWEN, supra note 15, § 5.3, at 282–83 & n.106.  The other four states are 
Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Virginia.  Id.   
 51. See Strict Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 52. OWEN, supra note 15, § 5.3, at 266–67. 
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merchantability.53  Strict liability, which seemed to be a good thing in the 
early sixties, later proved to have a number of serious deficiencies.  
First, strict liability does not work well for design and informational 
defects.  At first, it was thought that a design or informational defect was 
still a defect, or something that the ordinary user would refuse, and thus, it 
should fall under the strict-liability rule of section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.54  It was soon realized, however, that both design and 
informational defects inevitably involve negligence, since both refer to a 
standard that should have been followed.55  This finding was reconciled 
with strict liability in a number of jurisdictions by applying strict liability in 
a case and defining it to mean that an alternative, safer, feasible design or 
set of warnings was available and was not used or followed.56  This simply 
puts a patch on the problem, but the problem still exists.   
Second, when strict liability was treated as a separate cause of action 
from negligence, the door was opened for juries to find on the same set of 
facts that the defendant was not liable in strict liability but was liable under 
negligence.57  This is clearly inconsistent, as there can be no fault if the 
product is not defective.58  On appeal, the error was sometimes deemed 
harmless, and the verdict allowed to stand.59  But in other appeals, the case 
was remanded for a new trial with different jury instructions.60  When the 
problems already mentioned were not apparent, the very term “strict 
liability,” even when correctly explained to the jury, suggests a more severe 
kind of liability, and thus, the presence or absence of fault can be viewed as 
irrelevant, minimized, or even overlooked. 
Finally, and most importantly, the notion of strict liability is not 
necessary in modern products-liability litigation.  Strict liability only 
applies, with any degree of comfort, in manufacturing-defect cases, where 
 
 53. See id. § 5.9, at 335–37; see also infra notes 123–130 and accompanying text. 
 54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 55. OWEN, supra note 15, § 5.9, at 331.  For example, a better design or set of warnings. 
 56. See, e.g., Boatland of Hous., Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 745–46 (Tex. 1980). 
 57. See, e.g., Lecy v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 973 P.2d 1110, 1116–17 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1999) (holding that, under admiralty jurisdiction, the jury’s finding that the design of the 
yacht’s boat door system was not unreasonably dangerous precluded the jury from finding 
that the system was negligently designed).  This problem is also found when breach of 
warranty and strict liability are used for identical fact patterns. 
 58. See OWEN, supra note 15, § 5.9, at 332–33. 
 59. See id. at 333 n.34 (noting decisions where various courts found it acceptable for 
juries to find liability under one theory but not the other). 
 60. See Donald P. Blydenburgh, Analyzing Inconsistent Verdicts in Products Liability 
Cases: How the Law Promotes Them, Why Juries Render Them, and Why Some Courts 
Permit Them, 73 DEF. COUNS. J. 46, 47 (2006) (citing Witt v. Norfe, Inc., 725 F.2d 1277, 
1278 (11th Cir. 1984)). 
9
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fault is indeed irrelevant.61  Yet, even then, it is unnecessary, since 
manufacturing defects can be, and usually are, defined in terms of variation 
from the design that carries an unacceptable risk of harm.62  The North 
Carolina Products Liability Act expressly states that North Carolina does 
not apply strict liability in this context.63  Section 99B-1.1 declares in no 
uncertain terms that “[t]here shall be no strict liability in tort in product 
liability actions.”64   
The current products-liability act is divided into twelve sections, each 
covering a specific provision of the act.  Definitions pertinent to the act are 
set out in section 99B-1.65  This section defines terms used within the 
context of the act, such as “claimant,” “manufacturer,” and “seller.”66 
The act also provides protections for sellers by imposing an actual-
fault requirement.  This exception, set out in section 99B-2(a), prohibits an 
action against a seller who acquires and sells a product in a sealed container 
or against one who does not have a reasonable opportunity to inspect.67  
This essentially amounts to no liability without fault, and it is now the law 
in many jurisdictions.68  This is most clearly stated in judicial opinions,69 
but it would be more effective if it was incorporated into the text of section 
99B-1 as an exception to the definition of liability. 
One of the most significant changes in North Carolina products-
liability law came in section 99B-2(b), which effectively eliminated the 
 
 61. See OWEN, supra note 15, § 1.3, at 36. 
 62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
 63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1.1 (2013). 
 64. Id.   
 65. Id. § 99B-1. 
 66. Id.   
 67. Id. § 99B-2(a). 
 68. Twenty-four states now have some form of legislative protection for non-
manufacturing sellers.  See Jim Sinunu & Amy Kott, Commentary, Protection for Retailers: 
Developments in Strict Product Liability and Indemnification, WESTLAW J. PROD. LIAB., 
June 2011, at 1, 3.  But see Alani Golanski, Paradigm Shifts in Products Liability and 
Negligence, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 696 (2010) (“[T]he consensus view in this country has 
been that commercial product sellers are subject to privity-free, nondisclaimable strict 
liability in tort for physical harm caused by product defects existing at the time of sale.” 
(quoting James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan, and Other 
Countries Can Learn from the New American Restatement of Products Liability, 34 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (1999))). 
 69. See, e.g., McLaurin v. E. Jordan Iron Works, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 2d 590, 601–02 
(E.D.N.C. 2009) (holding that products-liability claims of negligence and breach of implied 
warranty could not stand because the distributor had no duty pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 99B-2(a) nor any reasonable opportunity to perform diagnostic tests that would have 
revealed latent defects). 
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privity requirement that existed in prior case law.70  Section 99B-2(b) 
provides that the “lack of privity of contract shall not be grounds 
for . . . dismissal” in an implied-warranty action against a manufacturer.71  
Therefore, a plaintiff may now sue the manufacturer under an implied-
warranty theory without fearing that the privity defense will be raised. 
Another significant feature of the products-liability act relates to the 
alteration or modification of a product.72  Under section 99B-3(a), if 
someone other than the manufacturer or seller alters or modifies the 
product, both parties are relieved of liability if (1) the modification or 
alteration was not done according to instructions or specifications, or (2) 
the alteration or modification was made without the express consent of the 
manufacturer or seller.73  Further, the statute broadly defines modification 
and alteration, and expressly excludes ordinary wear and tear.74  As a 
result, alteration and modification of a product are now affirmative 
defenses, and each one, if proven, is an absolute defense.75 
Section 99B-4 addresses knowledge or reasonable care on behalf of 
the plaintiff.76  If the plaintiff is injured because he disregarded “express 
and adequate instructions” of which he knew or should have known, the 
manufacturer or seller escapes liability.77  The manufacturer or seller will 
not be liable if the plaintiff knew the product was defective and used it in 
spite of the danger,78 or if he failed to use reasonable care under the 
circumstances.79   
The 1995 amendments to the products-liability act were the “first 
major alteration[s]” to the statute since its enactment in 1979.80  A section 
was added to the act outlining what a claimant must prove to prevail on a 
claim involving an inadequate warning or instruction.81  Section 99B-5 sets 
 
 70. Charles F. Blanchard & Doug B. Abrams, North Carolina’s New Products Liability 
Act: A Critical Analysis, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 171, 174 (1980). 
 71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-2(b). 
 72. See id. § 99B-3. 
 73. Id. § 99B-3(a). 
 74. Id. § 99B-3(b). 
 75. This is the case as long as North Carolina retains the defense of contributory 
negligence.  If North Carolina ever abolishes contributory negligence, it will be argued that 
a new section should be created for user fault.   
 76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4. 
 77. Id. § 99B-4(1). 
 78. Id. § 99B-4(2). 
 79. Id. § 99B-4(3). 
 80. Matthew William Stevens, Note, Strictly No Strict Liability: The 1995 Amendments 
to Chapter 99B, the Products Liability Act, 74 N.C. L. REV. 2240, 2241 (1996). 
 81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-5. 
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out the elements for an inadequate warning or instruction claim, but it does 
little more “than provide a succinct summary of the elements of a 
negligence action in products liability.”82   
Section 99B-6 was also added in 1995.83  This particular section “lays 
out the standard elements for unreasonable design and formulation cases 
and provides two alternative ways of proving negligence.”84  The first 
alternative is to show that the manufacturer unreasonably failed to 
implement a safer alternative design that could have been adopted without 
substantially impairing the product.85  The second alternative is to show 
that the design was so unreasonable that a reasonable person, aware of the 
relevant facts, would not use the product.86  
The act also provides protections for public policy purposes.  Section 
99B-10 provides immunity for donated food.87  This is an important 
provision because it allows perfectly good surplus food from stores, 
restaurants, churches, and private banquets to be donated for charitable use 
without the fear of liability.88  Immunity could be lost, however, if an injury 
is caused by the “gross negligence, recklessness, or intentional misconduct” 
of the donor.89 
B. A Proposal for Change 
Chapter 99B of the North Carolina General Statutes encompasses a 
good deal of modern products-liability law.  However, much of the law is 
found in judicial opinions, and these rules of law should be incorporated 
into the text of the statute.  The act also retains some unhelpful residual 
provisions from earlier developments;90 modification and explanatory 
development of some of these would significantly improve the state of 
products-liability law in North Carolina.  
Many of the newer provisions that bring the act in line with recent 
developments in products-liability law are in the form of judicial opinions.  
Although the act includes many of the features set out in reform proposals, 
especially adopted measures from MUPLA, more needs to be done.  The 
recent developments made by the courts should be integrated into the 
 
 82. See Stevens, supra note 80, at 2249. 
 83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6. 
 84. See Stevens, supra note 80, at 2250.   
 85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6(a)(1). 
 86. Id. § 99B-6(a)(2). 
 87. Id. § 99B-10. 
 88. Id.   
 89. Id.  
 90. For example, the user-expectation definition of defect. 
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appropriate sections of the act.  In short, going forward, North Carolina law 
would benefit from further revision of chapter 99B, specifically the 
revisions discussed below. 
1. Adopt the Functional Definitions of “Defect” 
One issue that needs attention is the way that defects and terms are 
defined.  Section 99B-1 could be greatly improved by including the 
definition of defect in terms of functionality.  This could easily be 
accomplished by listing and describing the three specific forms of defect: 
manufacturing, design, and informational (packaging) defects.91  The 
functional definitions of manufacturing or construction, design, and 
informational defects, as stated in MUPLA and in the Restatement, are 
widely acknowledged both in the courts and by learned commentators.92  
The definitions are present in North Carolina’s products-liability act, but 
they are scattered throughout.93  A more definite statement would better 
serve North Carolina products-liability law.   
Defect should be treated as a central notion and should be defined, not 
in general terms, but in terms of the basis of liability for each functional 
category.94  Products would then be deemed defective if a product (1) 
contains a manufacturing defect by virtue of the manufacturer’s variance 
from the original design or usual product, (2) is defective in design and it is 
shown that a safer, feasible design was available and should have been 
adopted by the manufacturer, or (3) is defective because of inadequate 
instructions or warnings where there is non-obvious danger or dangers, and 
the harm could be avoided or mitigated by feasible warnings and 
instructions.95 
MUPLA also adds a category of defect where a product is rendered 
dangerous by “express warranty” (commonly in promotional materials) 
either inducing users to rely on safety promises or encouraging them to 
relax their standards for self-care.96  The Restatement omits this provision 
 
 91. William C. Powers, Jr., The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEX. L. 
REV. 777, 782 (1983).  
 92. See Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 32, at 225–27, 233–34. 
 93. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99B-5, -6. 
 94. See Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 32, at 224 (discussing MUPLA’s 
classification of the different bases for liability). 
 95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
 96. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,721 (Oct. 31, 1979).  
See Leichtamer v. Am. Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 578 (Ohio 1981) (allowing the 
admission of evidence of a car commercial that would have a bearing on the expectations of 
an ordinary consumer).  This provision is not included in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
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because it sounds more in contract law.  But if, as suggested here, the UCC 
should no longer be used for tort cases, a further category should be 
inserted in section 99B-1 and “express warranty” should be clearly defined 
as a category of defect.  This schema constitutes a simpler and more 
rational way of looking at defective products.  It avoids much of the 
complexity and confusion inherent in the older statements of remedies.  
Chapter 99B does not, as it currently stands, successfully accomplish this 
because it has not done more than direct a plaintiff to a commentary 
regarding causes of action.   For example, if the manufacturer or seller has 
failed to respond adequately to a duty or adequately test its product for 
safety, it should be clearly stated that an action in negligence is available. 
The North Carolina Products Liability Act incorporates these 
definitions specifically in sections 99B-5 and 99B-6, but the sections are 
rendered unduly complex and somewhat confusing by appending older 
notions, such as “unreasonably dangerous.”  These older notions might be 
deemed harmless if they are intended merely to flesh out the functional 
definitions.97   
2. Abolish Separate Forms of Plaintiff Misconduct 
Plaintiff misconduct is traditionally divided into a number of forms, 
such as misuse, abuse, alteration, and failure to observe routine care.98  The 
North Carolina Products Liability Act follows in this general direction.99  
These will remain absolute defenses in North Carolina as long as 
contributory negligence is the law.  These categories are also over-
technical.  They are difficult for lawyers to understand and even more 
difficult to explain to jurors.  Both MUPLA and the Restatement advocate 
abolishing these separate notions and bundling all forms of plaintiff 
misconduct together in a single percentage amount to be deducted from the 
plaintiff’s recovery.100  A number of jurisdictions have followed suit, and 
North Carolina should consider taking this approach as well.101  
 
Products Liability.  This is quite probably because major manufacturers are adept at puffing 
and staying clear of legal warranting. 
 97. For example, pointing out that the design or warnings or the manufacturer in 
question must not only deviate from the suggested models, but the deviation must also be 
potentially harmful.  It would be better if the intent of these provisions was made plain by 
adding a comment distinguishing them from harmless defects. 
 98. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-3. 
 99. Id.   
 100. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,734; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 17 cmt. c. 
 101. See, e.g., Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Cal. 1978); Armstrong 
v. Cione, 738 P.2d 79, 82 (Haw. 1987). 
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MUPLA suggests the following simple procedure.  First, the court will 
ask the jury to estimate the total amount of damages.102  Second, the jury 
will be directed to decide how much the amount should be reduced for the 
total fault attributed to the plaintiff.103   
It has been suggested in a number of jurisdictions that this measure 
also applies to assumption of the risk.104  In cases where the plaintiff has 
expressly or impliedly agreed to hold the defendant harmless (primary 
assumption of the risk), the court could assign 100% of the fault to the 
plaintiff and no fault to the defendant.  In cases of secondary assumption of 
the risk, where the defendant was also at fault, the jury could be instructed 
to reduce the overall recovery by 25%, 50%, or 75%.  This would simplify 
the vexing question of user fault considerably. 
3. Replace Contributory Negligence with a Better Option for 
Addressing User Fault 
Beyond eliminating categories of user misconduct, North Carolina 
should consider a new method for determining user fault and liability.  
Contributory negligence is the law in North Carolina and in four other 
jurisdictions.105  Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, any fault on 
the part of the plaintiff completely bars recovery for the plaintiff.106  This 
harsh rule prevents a plaintiff with relatively minor fault from recovering 
from a far more negligent defendant.107 
The majority of states have moved away from the doctrine of 
contributory negligence in favor of other doctrines of user fault.  Pure 
comparative fault was originally established in the California case Li v. 
Yellow Cab Co. of California108 and is now used in twelve states.109  Under 
pure comparative fault, the plaintiffs lose only that part of the recovery that 
 
 102. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,734. 
 103. Id. at 62,734–35. 
 104. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975). 
 105. See Eli K. Best & John J. Donohue III, Jury Nullification in Modified Comparative 
Negligence Regimes, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 945, 950 (2012) (“Contributory negligence is still 
used in five jurisdictions: Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of 
Columbia.”) (footnote omitted). 
 106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4(3) (2013). 
 107. The doctrine was grounded on the notion of causation, as established in a 
nineteenth-century case in which the plaintiff rode a horse recklessly down a narrow street 
and caused his own harm.  Butterfield v. Forrester (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927. 
 108. Li, 532 P.2d at 1232. 
 109. Best & Donohue, supra note 105, at 949.  The states that use pure comparative 
negligence are Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington.  Id.   
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represents their own assigned percentage of fault.110  Thus, a plaintiff who 
is attributed 99% of the fault with a recovery of one million dollars will 
still receive ten thousand dollars.  This has always seemed eminently fair, 
but unfortunately, human beings, including jurors, are incapable of 
determining such precise percentage degrees of fault.111  In addition, there 
is an objection that this system encourages negligent behavior at the 
expense of more careful members of society by rewarding plaintiffs with 
high degrees of fault.112 
Other jurisdictions have implemented the doctrine of modified 
comparative fault.  The perceived defects in pure comparative fault 
schemes have encouraged many states to adopt modified comparative fault.  
In twenty-one states, the “fifty percent” rule of comparative negligence is 
used.113  Under this system, the “plaintiff[] can recover unless [his] 
negligence exceeds that of the defendant.”114  In other words, the plaintiff 
will recover as long as his percentage of negligence does not exceed 50%.  
Eleven states use the “forty-nine percent” rule.115  In those 
jurisdictions, the plaintiff can recover, as long as his percentage of 
negligence is less than that of the defendant.116  Unlike pure comparative 
fault, the jury is usually informed about the effects of their calculations 
before they make their decision.117  This may have the effect of causing a 
jury to allocate fault of less than 50% to a sympathetic, badly injured 
plaintiff.  That risk, however, is better than the alternative, where the 
plaintiff receives nothing if he is contributorily negligent.  
Finally, user fault is entirely irrelevant in jurisdictions that recognize 
strict liability in the context of products liability.118  This extreme notion 
was posited on the argument that, because it is not necessary to show that 
the defendant was at fault under strict liability, the plaintiff’s fault should 
 
 110. Li, 532 P.2d at 1229. 
 111. See id. at 1231 (discussing the haphazard ways that juries sometimes apportion 
fault). 
 112. See William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1953) 
(“It has been said that the rule is intended to discourage accidents, by denying recovery to 
those who fail to use proper care for their own safety . . . .”). 
 113. Best & Donohue, supra note 105, at 949.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at 950. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 952. 
 118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A & cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  But see 
id. § 402A cmt. h (providing that sellers are not responsible for unforeseeable “abnormal 
handling”). 
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likewise be irrelevant.119  This implausible doctrine has been abandoned by 
all but a few jurisdictions.  
Because no system of user fault is without flaw, an additional 
alternative is suggested.  This is based on the concurring opinion of Justice 
Clark in Daly v. General Motors Corp.120  Justice Clark contended that it 
was ridiculous to ask a jury to decide on a number between zero and 100% 
and that the jury should be presented with a uniform index factor such as 
30%, 50%, or 70%.121  This suggested alternative is in line with the way 
that psychologists approach similar problems, such as the measurement of 
pain and other things that extend over a broad spectrum of meanings so that 
they are difficult for individuals to describe.  In these circumstances, the 
decision maker is given a limited number of possibilities (for example, four 
or five shades of red to represent the pain he is feeling).   
In the measurement of fault, the jury, according to this scheme, would 
be presented with only three possibilities: 25%, 50%, and 75%.122  Using 
this system, it should be reasonably easy for a jury to agree on a percentage 
allocation of fault.  The court would then apply the results to the case.  If 
the jurors fail to reach a consensus, a mean value could easily be reached—
for instance, by striking out the lowest and highest estimates or adopting a 
mean value for their findings.  This eliminates the need to instruct the jury 
regarding the meaning of their decision; the procedure clearly describes 
what will happen.  This alternative would be simple to explain, reasonably 
fair, and it would hopefully avoid the manipulation of the verdict by the 
jury in order to bring their findings in line with their sympathies. 
4. Eliminate the UCC from Products-Liability Tort Cases 
Products-liability law incorporated several principles from the UCC 
that were very useful in its early development.  The most important of these 
principles was the implied warranty of merchantability.123  This included 
the warranty of safety, which was helpful in avoiding contributory 
negligence and the difficulty of providing proof of defendant fault.124  But 
these problems were addressed in other ways as products-liability law 
developed, and the cause of action in warranty is no longer needed.  
Furthermore, it shared with strict liability the potential to allow a jury, 
when confronted with two more-or-less identical causes of action (warranty 
 
 119. Id. § 402A & cmt. n. 
 120. Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1175 (Cal. 1978) (Clark, J., concurring). 
 121. Id. at 1176. 
 122. See id.  Some might add a 10% possibility for minimal fault. 
 123. OWEN, supra note 15, § 4.3, at 171. 
 124. Id. at 171, 176–77. 
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and product defect), to reach inconsistent verdicts.125  If the defendant is 
held liable under both warranty and product defect, there is no problem.  
But if the jury finds no defect in the article and at the same time finds that 
there was a breach of warranty, the findings are inconsistent because there 
can be no breach of warranty in an article that is not defective.126   
The problem might have been solved if the revised version of Article 
2 of the UCC had been approved, allowing the UCC to be used in contract 
cases but not in torts.  Unfortunately, for other reasons, it was not 
approved.127  The only remaining option is for individual states to enact 
legislation that restricts the use of the UCC to contracts and eliminates its 
use in tort actions.  This would be a simpler solution to the problem than 
waiting for a new version of Article 2 to be approved. 
Eliminating the use of the UCC in tort cases would also solve the 
problem of inconsistent statutes of limitation and repose.  When a party’s 
statute of limitations has run for a cause of action in contracts, the party 
may attempt to bring his action in products liability, where either the 
triggering event or the time limitation allowed is more favorable.128  The 
provisions governing the statute of limitations and repose should be the 
same in all products-liability cases.  
The distinction between products-liability cases and those sounding in 
contract should be clearly stated in North Carolina’s products-liability act.  
It is well established that products liability is limited to personal injury and 
damage to property other than to the article sold.129  Damage to the article 
 
 125. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 
1998). 
 126. See, e.g., Lecy v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 973 P.2d 1110, 1116 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1999).  A similar problem can occur where strict liability and negligence are both pleaded. 
 127. See Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 
HASTINGS L.J. 607, 611–12 & nn.15–17 (2001) (providing an insider’s perspective into the 
attempted passage of a revised draft of Article 2). 
 128. See, e.g., E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 861 
(1986).  In East River Steamship Corp., the plaintiffs originally brought tort and warranty 
claims, but after a statute-of-limitations defense was interposed, several plaintiffs were 
dismissed and the complaint was amended to allege only tort claims.  Id.   
 129. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1(3) (2013) (defining a “[p]roduct liability action” as “any 
action brought for or on account of personal injury, death or property damage caused by or 
resulting from the manufacture, construction, design, formulation, development of 
standards, preparation, processing, assembly, testing, listing, certifying, warning, 
instructing, marketing, selling, advertising, packaging, or labeling of any product”); see also 
E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 871–75 (holding that there was no negligence or products-
liability claim where the only injured property was the purchased product itself). 
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sold is a contract matter, which should be brought under UCC 
provisions.130 
5. Address Liability for Used Goods 
Liability for used goods is not addressed in chapter 99B.  The general 
principle that fault should be required131 is a good one and might be 
deemed to refer to used goods, but the rule needs to be clearly stated.  The 
general rule is that sellers of used goods are not liable, especially if they 
sell the good “as is.”132  Sellers are liable, however, if they fail to notify the 
buyer of known defects or if a defect would have been discovered through 
reasonable inspection of the goods.133  Some courts have treated expensive, 
recently manufactured used cars as being sufficiently new to be covered 
under this rule.134  However, the seller in this situation is in no better 
position than the buyer to guarantee the safety of the product, especially if 
the product is sold “as is.”135  Thus, a used car should not be governed by 
the same rules as a new car. 
It is recommended that the rules governing used products be 
incorporated into chapter 99B.  It is also recommended that nearly new, 
expensive products be treated as used items.  Warranty for parts and labor 
is commonly supplied with such items, but the buyer should seek further 
warranty.  Breach of any additional warranties given by the seller would lie 
in contract. 
6. Expand the Learned-Intermediary Rule  
The learned-intermediary rule in section 99B-5(c) refers only to the 
ordering of prescription drugs by physicians.136  This application is too 
narrow, since the learned-intermediary rule is intended to apply to many 
persons who might be regarded as reliable mediators of warnings, like 
safety officers, factory foremen, or foremen in garages.137  The learned-
 
 130. See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 878 (1997) 
(describing that the loss of the added superstructures on a defective hull were deemed 
property other than the article sold); E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 871–75; see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 & cmts. d, e. 
 131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4. 
 132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 8 & cmts. a, k. 
 133. Id. § 8. 
 134. See OWEN, supra note 15, § 6.5, at 435. 
 135. See id. 
 136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-5(c). 
 137. See Keith A. Laughery, Comment, Warnings in the Workplace: Expanding the 
Learned Intermediary Rule to Include Employers in the Context of the Product 
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intermediary doctrine provides that it is sufficient to deliver a warning to a 
responsible person who has a duty to pass on the warning to the ultimate 
user.138  However, the exceptions almost swallow the rule.  The learned-
intermediary rule will not avoid liability if the danger is great, if the learned 
intermediary might fail to pass on the warning, and if it is feasible to 
directly warn the ultimate user.139  It is clear that the first of these two 
exceptions are inevitably present so that the rule reads that the ultimate user 
should be warned if it is reasonably feasible to do so. 
The learned-intermediary rule is most applicable to doctors who must 
adapt any warnings and instructions to the peculiar conditions of their 
patients, but there are two exceptions that are recognized.  Birth control 
pills140 and mass immunization programs141 require adequate warnings and 
instructions to be provided to the ultimate user.  In both situations, 
physician involvement with the patient is considered to be limited so that 
there is a duty on the part of the suppliers to directly warn the ultimate 
users. 
It is recommended that the rule be stated generally not just as it 
applies to prescribing physicians.  The general exception should state that, 
where it is feasible to provide a warning to the ultimate user, a warning 
should be provided.  In addition, a note might be added to include 
illustrative cases—in particular, cases relating to mismatched parts on 
assembled truck wheels where mistakes could be alleviated by stamping 
the items to be matched on their parts. 
CONCLUSION 
A revision of the North Carolina Products Liability Act would be the 
best method of incorporating additional products-liability provisions into 
North Carolina law.  While many of the provisions of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability and MUPLA are already incorporated 
into North Carolina’s products-liability act or in the case law derived from 
 
Manufacturer/Employer/Employee Relationship, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 627, 632, 635–36 
(2005); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. i. 
 138. See Laughery, supra note 137, at 632; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. i. 
 139. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. i; see also Richard B. 
Goetz & Karen R. Growdon, A Defense of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 63 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 421, 428 (2008) (discussing cases in which the manufacturer had a duty to 
provide a direct warning to the consumer). 
 140. Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of Learned-
Intermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R.5th 1, 56–61 (1998).  
 141. Id. at 50–51. 
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the act, both sources should be formally included in chapter 99B.  In many 
cases, older notions in the existing provisions of chapter 99B should be 
removed or clarified to avoid confusion. 
From trading contributory negligence for some version of comparative 
fault, to expanding the learned-intermediary rule to new contexts, simple 
changes to chapter 99B could bring North Carolina’s products-liability law 
into the twenty-first century.  This could be accomplished with relative 
ease with guidance from MUPLA, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability, and the example of other jurisdictions that have 
implemented modern changes.  
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